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Abstract
This thesis documents the successful development and testing of a more
secure industrial control system field device architecture and software. The
implementation of a secure field device has had limitations in the past due to a
lack of secure operating system and guidelines. With the recent verification of OK
Labs SEL4 microkernel, a verified operating system for such devices is possible,
creating a possibility for a secure field device following open standards using
known security protocols and low level memory and functionary isolation. The
virtualized prototype makes use of common hardware and an existing secure
field device architecture to implement a new level of security where the device is
verified to function as expected. The experimental evaluation provides
performance data which indicates the usefulness of the architecture in the field
and security function integration testing to guarantee secure programs can be
implemented on the device. Results of the devices functionality are hopeful,
showing useful performance for many applications and further development as a
fully functional secure field device.
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Chapter I
Introduction
This thesis documents the design, development, and testing of security
software in a secure microkernel device. The device could alter the way industrial
control system field devices are currently implemented, adding many layers of
additional security to common devices without the need for hardware upgrades
by using a modern architecture system and open source security software. The
software tested will be shown to have more secure access to other devices, its
own hardware, networking resources, and communication between its own local
software.
Field devices are a critical component of industrial control systems. They
are used in many industries, especially utilities, and historically these devices
have lacked cyber-security features. In the past, physical access to the device
was necessary to attack it; in the last decade there have been networking
advances that allow high speed networking to almost any location, no matter
how remote. Advances currently available for devices, previously isolated, mean
many of them now have remote access and are connected to the Internet. Field
devices and subsequently industrial control systems are vulnerable to malicious
attacks

that

could

damage

their

physical

systems

environmental impacts, without additional security.
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and

have

serious

Added security to the networking interface of field devices is not enough. A
separate hardware firewall could be added to deter attackers, but this raises
additional

hardware

costs,

another

device

to

support,

and

does

not

comprehensively secure the device. It is suggested that the device must be
secured from every logical point of attack, not just the network interface. The
device must be secured from physical access via its own terminal or directly
connected serial programming devices, from unwanted network access by a
firewall or other discriminating software for both outward and inward
communications, and the device must be secured from its own internal software
that may have been modified for malicious intent.
A secure device would be an unreasonable goal without guarantee of
secure software. This starts at the most basic level of operation; the device
kernel. A secure microkernel for which to build the other software systems is a
requirement for the entire project. A verified correct microkernel exists for the
use in a more secure experiment. The SEL4 microkernel has been formally
verified and will be used for the experiment. The kernel is open source and is
able to be modified if necessary. However, any modifications will not be verified
and therefore should be avoided if at all possible.
This thesis presents a review of literature and research related to this
experiment. Chapter II details the extent of the literature review describing the
architecture of the system based on previous work, the security features hoping
to by implemented in the system, and the microkernel used. Chapter III
4

discusses the design architecture of the build system, a more in-depth analysis of
the security features necessary of a secure device, and the use of memory
isolation in the secure microkernel. Chapter IV is an overview of the experiment
and how it was designed, showing the operation of the system and the
implemented software. It details the use of the software and how it should be
implemented to best secure the device. Chapter V shows the software that was
implemented before the end of the experiment, testing, performance, barriers
overcome through the experimentation process, and how software verification
might be used to complete the project. The final chapter explains the outcomes
of the experiment, presents conclusions drawn about the project and secure
devices, and indicates future research and experimentation directions that may
be beneficial for the project.
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Chapter II
Literature Review
SCADA Security for Field Devices
SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems are currently
vulnerable to cyber-security attacks. Many SCADA systems are insecure by
today’s Internet standards; they have chronic and pervasive vulnerabilities [1].
Many of the current efforts in security assessment involve searching for known
vulnerabilities [2]. Computer controlled systems should be subjected to scrutiny
and this is often ignored at the management level. With the upgrade of electrical
grids (smart grids); transportation systems; and water distribution systems; now
is the time to upgrade the security scheme as well. [1]
Field devices are small embedded computers running their own operating
system, discussed in a later section. The recent Stuxnet attack shows the
importance of securing these devices [3]. SCADA devices control major
processes in utilities and industry. An attack on these systems could be
devastating. Hijacking of SCADA and field devices can disrupt processes and shut
down utilities. In some systems, a simple technique known as SQL injection can
be a successful weapon. This is inadequate protection and needs to advance as
devices join IP networks.
SCADA systems can have remote vulnerabilities, but can also be affected by
inside users that are trained improperly or are malicious. Only authorized
6

personnel should have access to the interior features of the devices. This shows
a need for IP security (firewalls), authentication, secure remote access, and
intrusion detection without a significant cost upgrade for vendors. [1]

OPSAID
OPSAID (Open PCS Security Architecture for Interoperable Design) is a
program intended to overcome security issues in the short term for SCADA
devices. PCS (Process Control Systems) weren’t designed with adequate regard
for security issues. Communication was typically through serial links at a single
location segregated from the outside network. As industry has evolved, so has
the need for remote control and diagnostics of systems. PCS devices are now
moving to using TCP/IP as the standard communication and off the shelf
software for their firmware. Without an added layer of security, anyone with
knowledge of the widely used software can control the system. Typical IT
systems incorporate secure event logging, authentication, and firewall services;
PCS rarely uses any of these.
The OPSAID project was designed to address security issues using
established and available IT standards for a corporate network. Using mini-itx
computers and the open source Linux operating system Ubuntu, the project has
confirmed that it is possible and cost effective to build a more secure PCS field
security appliance using open source software with thorough testing. OPSAID is
not meant to be a standard for security, as networks and security needs will
change in the future. An “all or nothing” standard is inappropriate. The purpose
7

is to provide a roadmap and proof of concept for vendors to address their own
security issues and maintain interoperability with other OPSAID components. [4]
The security features in the OPSAID implementation include:


Virtual Private Networking/Encryption



Firewall Services



Network Intrusion Detection Systems



Host Intrusion Detection Systems



Event Logging



Event Database Storage, Alert Generation & Visualization



End-device Configuration Session Logging



Authentication



Device Management [4]

LEMNOS
The Lemnos project was built upon the OPSAID projects component
modules for interoperability. The purpose of the project is to output artifacts
referred to as Interoperable Configuration Profiles. The asset is defined by the
needs of the owner, both functionality and security. The Lemnos approach is
focused on interoperability for secure modules. Much like the OPSAID project,
Lemnos is built on open source software, but allows for “best in class” cyber
security solutions for various points in their infrastructure. [5]
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Microkernel Architecture
A kernel is the lowest level of software abstraction on hardware. Its duties
include managing system resources and connecting applications to actual data
processing on the hardware level. In a monolithic kernel device drivers, file
systems, and many other features are a part of the operating system kernel.
These services require privileged access to system resources, usually access to
physical memory , and only kernel code can accesses these resources.
In microkernels, most of the features, such as device drivers, file IO, etc.
are implemented outside of the privileged mode of the processor. This allows for
improved security since these software services are limited to only specific
resources. The drawback of this approach is performance. A microkernel will
implement the smallest set of operations and abstractions in the kernel and the
drivers, file systems, and other functions in user-space. [6]
Microkernel History
In monolithic kernel design, programs in the kernel can access any
resources the kernel has access to, all of the physical memory. They are
“trusted” not to violate their memory boundaries. This structure grew beyond
usability as operating systems grew to enormous proportions. To help calm this
growing beast in kernel space, layered operating systems were developed.
Modular programming techniques helped to handle the scale of software
development. Functions in layered operating systems are organized in a structure
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to allow communication and interaction between adjacent layers only. Still, most
layers were implemented and executed in kernel mode.
The layered approach, shown in Figure 2.1, helped simplify programming
and the size of the kernel, but each layer possessed a great deal of functionality.
A change in one layer could cause undesirable effects in adjacent layers, difficult
to trace bugs, and numerous other problems. The interaction between these
layers made it exceptionally difficult to build in security due to every layer being
able to access all functions of the adjacent layers. A bug in one layer could allow
malicious code to gain control of the hardware or disrupt operation of the device
entirely.

Figure 2.1: Layered kernel architecture [7]
10

The microkernel was created under the philosophy that only the essential
functions of the operating system were implemented in the actual kernel. Less
essential functions and applications are built on top of the microkernel. These
functions operate in user mode as opposed to the more secure kernel mode.
There is no concrete rule as to what is essential and should be compiled into the
kernel, but the common definition is for most services that were previously part
of the operating system are now external to the kernel as a separate module or
subsystem that interacts with the kernel and with each other; these services can
include security services, windowing systems, virtual memory managers, file
systems, and device drivers. [7]
Microkernel Design
The design of a microkernel is implemented to solve some of the problems
mentioned in monolithic kernels and layered operating systems mentioned
above. A microkernel architecture is a horizontal implementation of the
abstraction system, as opposed to the vertical model of a layered architecture.
All operating system components external to the microkernel are implemented as
server processes that interact with one another on a peer basis in user mode,
shown in Figure 2.2. To communicate, typically they will send messaged through
the microkernel via IPC calls. This allows bugs and unintended actions to be
more easily traced since layers are not talking to each other, but instead can only
interact by way of loggable messages through the microkernel. This allows for a
higher level of security, accountability, and more controllable operation.
11

Figure 2.2: Microkernel architecture [7]
The microkernel is required to act as the message exchange between the
user mode components. The microkernel will validate the messages, relay them
to the user mode recipients, and grants access to hardware. The microkernel
adds extra security by performing message transfers through a protection
function; it prevents messages from being passed unless exchange between the
components is allowed. This prevents hijacking of drivers or other system
resources by unauthorized components. This is a client/server architecture within
a single computer, where each component can be thought of a peer client on a
network and they can only transmit messages, which can be filtered, through the
server. These messages can be sent to other components and request the
primitive functions compiled into the microkernel.
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Microkernel design creates a uniform interface for processes to make
requests. A component does not need to make a distinction between kernel-level
and user-level services as all requests will be processed by the kernel. This
allows for easy extensibility; newer components or modules can be installed on
the microkernel to allow for the use of newer hardware, alternative file systems,
and new software techniques come to light. Allowing a modest microkernel to be
programmed once and used even after computer upgrades or software
technologies change. The upgraded services do not require all the services to be
updated.
A Microkernel architecture is more efficient by design. Components can be
easily removed for a smaller footprint or replaced for a system lacking powerful
hardware. The memory manager can be easily replaced to deal with small
amounts of RAM and a lack of swap space if the hardware requires it. [7]
Microkernels for Secure Field Devices
Field devices connect sensors, actuators, and other input/output peripherals
to a control network. This provides remote measuring and control capabilities.
These devices must be secured to avoid unauthorized control of utilities and
other applications. The security of these devices directly reflects to the safety of
the operators and everyone involved with the use of the utility. Unauthorized
access to field devices can also cause massive physical damage to expensive
equipment.
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To secure field devices, the microkernel controlling the hardware has to be
secure. No device is impenetrable, but care can be taken to make it as difficult as
possible. This was less necessary when devices were on isolated networks; many
devices are now accessible via the Internet and therefore must the security
scheme must change. Modern secure microkernels employ isolated partitions,
each with its own isolated memory and contact to other hardware, software, or
instrumentation; This is referred to as the partitions protection domain. This
protection domain allows for software of varying levels of security to be
decoupled from the microkernel and other less secure applications. [8]
A microkernel for a secure field device will compartmentalize components
and allow the trusted computing base (TCB) to consist of only the kernel and
trusted security-critical code in kernel mode. All other applications reside in user
mode with limited access to the secure areas of the device. The microkernel will
determine what trusted resources can be accessed from these less secure
compartments and only allow access to security critical code or data when
absolutely necessary, all through IPC calls to the kernel [9]. This small amount of
secure code and the small size of the kernel allow for the code to be thoroughly
checked for possible errors and unintended operation, even allowing for
mathematical proof of the code’s operation. [8]
OKL4 Microkernel
To use a microkernel for security purposes, the IPC must be fast and
efficient or else other process communications might be used, bypassing the
14

security of the kernel. Most microkernels exhibit poor IPC performance. The L4
microkernel is built to improve the IPC performance of L3 and other pre-existing
microkernels [10].
The OKL4 microkernel was designed by OK Labs as a highly flexible, high
performance microkernel. Providing a minimal layer of hardware-abstraction on
which modules can be built. Each component is isolated in the system from
programming errors or malicious code introduced to the system by other
components. A feature is only implemented in the kernel if it was impossible to
provide the service outside of the microkernel with the same level of security.
OKL4 provides a trust and security implementation using hardware and
software

mechanisms

to

enforce

security.

The

API

provides

time,

resource/memory, communication protection, and fault isolation. Using address
space control and IPC for each component or thread to communicate the kernel
can create separate memory spaces for each component that are independent of
one another. These cells are completely isolated and can only communicate
through IPC. Each call is verified through the security model that the component
has access rights to the hardware, data, or other component it is trying to
communicate with, therefore containing malicious code or activity to an
individual cell. [11]
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SEL4 Microkernel

SEL4 is a mathematically verified version of the OKL4 microkernel. Since the
microkernel is the only part of the operating system that executes in the
privileged mode of the hardware, there is no protection from faults occurring in
the kernel. Every bug could potentially cause physical damage. The kernel is a
major part of the TCB that can bypass security.
Using an interactive, machine-assisted and machine-checked proof the SEL4
microkernel was formally verified. This does not mean it is necessarily secure,
but that it has been mathematically verified that the C code operates specifically
as the kernel should behave. The verification was run on the C code itself.
Therefore, the kernel itself is not verified, but the code that it was compiled from
was verified to operate as specified. To declare the kernel as verified, one must
also assumed the correctness of the C compiler, linker, assembly code,
hardware, and boot code. [12]
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Chapter III
System Design
It is shown in Chapter II that operating system security in field devices
cannot be guaranteed. To help deal with this issue, the microkernel was
designed as a horizontal approach to abstraction based on modules instead of a
layered monolithic kernel approach. This allows the kernel to segregate memory
and permissions based on the needs of the module and can help unwanted
access by a corrupt piece of software from accessing all areas of the device.
The SEL4 microkernel is designed and verified as correct, and operates
discussed in Chapter II. The experiment is designed around the SEL4 microkernel
to determine speed in which communication can be achieved between processes
in a secure environment.

Security Model
The security for this project is based off the OPSAID [4] security project
discussed in Chapter II. The several aspects of field device security provided by
OPSAID are listed below and their relevance to the project is stated. Using these
security upgrades for field devices the security and performance of devices can
be tested.
Virtual private networking and encryption is necessary in modern devices.
Any device operating on the Internet should be located behind a firewall
preventing unwanted access. To enter these networks and gain full access to
17

their resources it is necessary to virtualize a private network. A private network is
intended to be used only by the devices physically connected to the local
network, where security should be less of a concern. These networks were
common before the Internet. Now, with the invent of virtualized networking, it is
possible to encrypt a tunnel into a network and allow remote devices to be
included in a private network. Only devices on the private, hopefully encrypted,
network are authorized to communicate with the device. This does not need to
be supported by the device directly, but by some gateway device on the
network, although, it can be internalized to the device as it is in the OPSAID
project.
Firewall services are included in the OPSAID standard architecture. A
firewall is a software tool used to deny communications from certain processes,
programs, ports or specific devices. This is useful for blocking unwanted
programs from finding an open port on a device or a network. Only approved
processes have access to the network. Malicious software running on the device
will not be able to create an outside connection without meeting the policy of the
firewall. Most home computers and home routers will have some firewall policy
that will try and protect the machine. This is common in the PC network
environment and should be used for field devices as well. A custom policy can be
implemented to not hinder the current functions of the device, but protect from
dangerous software and DDOS attacks.
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Network intrusion detection systems are used to detect and notify the
network administrator of an unauthorized program or user on the network.
Typically, these systems operate by analyzing network traffic for suspicious or
malicious activity. The use of these systems can be beneficial to any network,
but particularly to those that control expensive/dangerous equipment or contain
sensitive information. The software can potentially detect an intruder and in
some cases severe the connection to the network. In the event that a program
or user has bypassed the virtual network security and the firewall for the
network, this additional software could be the added layer necessary to finally
stop communication with the device.
If a user can get on the network and send commands to a device, the
network intrusion detection has a chance to stop them. However, if they
penetrate software on the device itself, there may not be suspicious network
activity. Host intrusion detection systems cover this base by monitoring and
analyzing internals of the system. Host security typically consists of watching
memory for unverified modifications, be it to a database or program memory
depending on the device and its uses. Using checksums of file sizes, date
attributes, and permissions, the system can check for changes that were not
authorized. Host security may not prevent access to sensitive information, but it
can warn the owner of the information that it has been accessed and possibly
distributed. Detection systems are a notification system, not necessarily a
prevention mechanism.
19

Event logging can be useful in determining the fault when a problem does
occur. Problems in electronic devices occur for many reasons; sometimes these
reasons cannot be determined. For security, the device or the owner needs to
know if the error was a software/hardware fault or was caused by mischievous
activity. Event logging allows for the device to keep records of errors. These
records can contain timestamps, user with access, the process that initiated the
error, and other vital information that can help the owner determine if the
device’s security has been compromised. Event logging is also helpful if an
accident occurs in the vicinity of a piece of equipment. The device may have
logged activities in the error, from its current operating level, process, or duty to
sensor data at the time of the accident; which can be useful for troubleshooting
or to determine user error.
Event storage and alert generation are related to event logging. The logged
data can be stored in a database for later analysis and any error logs can
generate an alert for the device owner. The owner can be notified in real time of
an error instead of having to discover the event own their own. If an error occurs
the device can instantly send an alert via the Internet or internal network so that
the error can be dealt with without unnecessary downtime, be it an intruder,
hardware failure, or software error.
Session logging is used to determine what commands were sent to the
device and when. When the device is accessed remotely or physically, all actions
are logged to determine when a configuration problem was caused. The device
20

can benefit from logging changes, as the owner knows what was changed and
can quickly and successfully reconfigure the device. The reconfiguration can be
automated to return the device to a previous configuration with ease when a
fault is detected.
Field devices, which originally were accessed only via an isolated a physical
network, are now connected using Internet technologies. When isolated, access
to the device was granted by lock and key; now these devices can be remotely
accessed, potentially through corporate networks, from anywhere in the world.
No need to identify a user was necessary if they had physical access to the
device, but this is no longer standard. Every electronic network needs some sort
of authentication to keep access limited to only privileged users. A minimalistic
user authentication and password protection is standard on most PC networks
and that is the level of security trying to be reached by the OPSAID project for
field devices. Therefore, there needs to be a built in software mechanism to
authenticate the user on the device, whether this be a username and password
or some other means of verified user authentication.
Remote device management already exists, but could be much more
secure. Device management is an important part of having a device, occasionally
it will need to be reconfigured or the logs accessed. This should be done through
secure software that has access rights to all of the software listed above. This
software should be used to view or download the logs, sessions, alerts, firewall
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policy, and any other device configuration from one easy resource that can be
accessed securely and remotely.
All of this software already exists. It is waiting to be installed and
configured for use in field devices and SCADA systems to help protect the device
and ensure normal operation. Without these additional software products, a
device is vulnerable to many types of attacks and the results can be devastating.
Every device should be secured in some way, but Internet enabled devices or
any that can accessed remotely need to have many added layers of security to
prevent unwanted access and malicious software actions.

Prior Work
Security has been a concern in field and SCADA devices for some time. This
is not a new area of research. The OPSAID project sets a plan for implementing
better security in these devices. The Lemnos project adds to the security of the
modules installed on the device and interoperability between the devices without
the added level of security impeding the functionality of the device.
There has been work done in security hardened field devices and operating
system security for the devices. Some of the work mentioned in Chapter II needs
to be detailed further as it is important to the development of the experiment
and the need for the research. Graham and Hieb [8] have researched the need
for SCADA security and the inherent issues of securing the devices. Through
22

their research they have concluded a number of possible future research
directions for the field. Using an isolated kernel, the device could possibly be
much more secure. Using the OKL4 microkernel as a means of isolating separate
processes, the experiment explored IPC communication on hardware and its
effectiveness for security applications.
The research of Graham and Hieb was continued by Luyster [9]. His
research involved developing a prototype based on the hardened security
research using the OKL4 microkernel for RTU control devices and industrial
embedded systems. The research suggested that the added layers of security
added 20 to 100 milliseconds of delay to IPC calls that typically took 500
microseconds to complete. The research suggests there is a need to test how
security additions and IPC calls function on a more secure verified kernel, such
as the SEL4 microkernel, now commercially available.

Memory Isolation
The SEL4 microkernel allows for all cells to be isolated from each other
within memory. No process may read or modify the memory space of another
process. The only communication between the processes is via IPC through the
kernel. This allows for a more secure environment than one user space for all of
the components of the system to access.
A cell is a concept unique to security software. The OKL4 microkernel
isolates specific memory for usage in the cells and allocates these addresses to
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only one process. The memory used in these cells is stored in the large bank of
memory for the device, typically RAM. This is virtual addressed by the processor
and then allocated to a thread, process, or to an entire cell. This allocation is
referred to as a protection domain. This is a memory segment that is completely
isolated from all other memory segments virtually. There is no way for memory
within a protection domain to be accessed by any other processes than the one
to which it was allocated.
For this isolation to be possible, no software can have access to direct
memory mapping except the kernel. Any other software must use virtual memory
addresses that are mapped one to one with physical memory. These virtual
memory addresses are then translated by the kernel. The processes and cells
have no way of determining absolute memory locations, this is vital to the
security of the memory segments. This is in contrast to typical monolithic kernels
which allow device drivers and other software modules in the kernel space
unrestricted access to the entirety of the system memory.
Like cells, threads operate within a protection domain. However, multiple
threads can exist within a single protection domain, whereas multiple cells
cannot. A cell can be thought of more like a program, that can have a single
running process or consist of multiple threads within its protection domain.
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Communication
In the OKL4 and SEL4 microkernels, all communication between different
components must be done through IPC calls. There are two types of IPC calls in
the OKL4 architecture. These calls are referred to as blocking and non-blocking
calls. Blocking calls will stop a process or thread until the corresponding IPC call
has completed, either sending or receiving. This is useful if the thread is waiting
on access to a locked component and needs the information to continue,
however, the possibility exists for a race condition in this situation and it should
be avoided where possible. Non-blocking calls will immediately attempt to send
or receive the desired IPC call, but may fail if the other component is locked or
unready for the call. The failure can be handled in software and the component
can wait to send or receive again or continue with the process. This is important
to avoid race conditions as a failure is easy to deal with, but a locked process
waiting on a device that may never be ready can be devastating to a system
unless designed to operate where these situations cannot exist, such as a state
machine.

Summary of Design Consederation
It has been suggested that using existing security software available now
that the security of field and SCADA devices can be greatly enhanced. By using
some or all of the layered security described by the OPSAID project above, a
device may be updated/upgraded to be compatible with corporate secure
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computer networks without posing significant security risks from outside users
and malicious software on the network.
However, these network and device protocols are not secure enough. The
device must also protect itself from malicious components installed on the device
itself. Using microkernels and software designed for memory isolation the device
can protect from unwanted access to hardware and secure data. These
components must be able to communicate securely with the device and the
other components in the system. This is all possible and an experiment will be
designed in Chapter IV to show some of the features of these more secure
devices and their performance.
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Chapter IV
System Implementation
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate whether, or not, while using proper
security protocols and methodologies, reasonable performance can still be
achieved in kernel communication. The design is based on the OKL4 wombat
Linux kernel and its provided image. This para-virtualized distribution of Linux
runs on the OKL4 kernel, more specifically on the SEL4 microkernel in this
experiment, and is an entire functional operating system with virtualized
hardware that can communicate with the actual hardware through the base
microkernel. The operating system can also communicate with other system
components that are running in separate cells.
Using two wombat distributions and the SEL4 microkernel, it can be shown
that secure communication can be achieved, that its performance is reasonable,
and that isolated components can operate independently of each other without
risk of corruption from the other component.
The SEL4 system image was built on an Ubuntu Linux machine using a
dedicated cross compiler for the x86 architecture designed for compiling for a
generic x86 machine using only the most basic generic hardware. The tool is
Crosstool-ng and has cross compiling capabilities for many architectures. The
cross compiler compiled the wombat supervisor, timing server, and all other
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SEL4 components to be run on the kernel. The kernel was delivered precompiled
and was not rebuilt during this experiment.
The kernel modules for this experiment were compiled using the same cross
compiler. The default module settings were used with the exception of one. Net
filter was not compiled due to compiler errors and was unnecessary for the
experiment, therefore was excluded. The module configuration is included in the
appendix.
Many different IPC and other SEL4 programs were compiled. The wombat
supervisor, the program used to load a paravirtualized Linux image into memory,
was compiled and configured to load two identical images in parallel. The timing
server was compiled using the default settings and is included with every
Wombat Linux image as Linux cannot function without a system clock and the
hardware clock is unavailable to the SEL4 kernel.

Hardware Emulation
The Ubuntu Linux machine used to compile the test system was emulated
using Sun Virtualbox. This was for convenience as it is entirely portable between
the different locations and computers used for the testing. The test system itself
was emulated using Qemu as the generic x86 system. An emulated system was
chosen, originally, to easily start and stop the system multiple times during
testing. It was shown in later testing that the system could be booted on actual
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hardware, however serial output was garbled, and efforts to correct this were
unsuccessful.
The Qemu machine must be operated in a Linux environment, because the
Windows build of Qemu cannot display the debug output from the SEL4 kernel.
As no Linux machines were easily available for the experiment and the Virtualbox
Ubuntu machine used for compiling was already configured for testing and
included the compiled image, it was used for the Qemu test machine as well.
The Qemu SEL4 hardware is therefore emulated in the Ubuntu virtual machine.
Meaning, for the tests, the program is running on an emulator in an emulator.
This will affect the overall performance of the results. If the experiments are
compared to each other, the performance should be affected equally and
therefore the relative results will show a feasibility and performance increase or
decrease even in a doubly emulated test bed.

Software
The software for this experiment includes the SEL4 microkernel, the
Wombat Linux image, and custom IPC examples running on the microkernel. The
code for IPC examples is included in an appendix. The Wombat images will be
used for in operating system testing of IPC speeds and cell to cell IPC
communication between two Wombat images.
The IPC examples will show the speed and effectiveness of IPC on the
lowest level of the SEL4 kernel. Building a program directly on the kernel will
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yield the best results. The IPC program will make use of multiple threads to
communicate through the kernel between the memory segregated threads via
IPC.

Figure 4.1: Communication in SEL4 and Memory Segmentation
The experiment will contain IPC calls from the userland built on the
Wombat Linux cell. This program will run within the paravirtualized Linux
environment and make IPC writing and reading calls to the kernel. The program
can only communicate with the Linux API, as if it was a standard distribution,
and cannot access directly any other cell or hardware. The Linux cell must then
relay the information to the kernel that will write the IPC call to the appropriate
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register on hardware. The IPC cell, if it wished to read this message, would
contact the kernel and request an IPC message. This is the only means of
communication between cells. All programs and threads in the userland are
dedicated to the Linux cell and cannot communicate with or be aware of the
memory space of other cells.
An IPC cell will also be designed to communicate with the Linux
environment in the manner described above. This will test both the IPC
performance in an operating system environment and directly on the kernel.
Tests will show both performance of cell to cell, Linux to cell, and Linux to Linux
IPC communication.

Security Isolation and Communication
In SEL4 memory is semi-isolated in threads and completely isolated in cells.
The only communication between memory isolated processes is by IPC through
the kernel API as described in Figure 4.1. For the system to be considered more
secure than its predecessors, the software must take advantage of this isolation
and operate within its dedicated memory space.
Software running in the user-space of the Linux cell will be considered
insecure on the basis that Linux is a robust monolithic operating system, even
the small version of embedded Linux used for Wombat. There are many areas of
the operating system that could have memory overflows or other vulnerabilities
allowing attack or control of the system. For this reason, no program operating
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within the Linux cell shall have access to vital data or I/O devices unless
specifically designed and allowed to control said device. In this situation, the
device should be dedicated to the Linux cell and not accessible from other cells
to avoid communication bypassing IPC.
All security software should be kept minimal as to not introduce bugs and
operate directly on the kernel in a cell parallel to the IPC cell in Figure 4.1. See
Figure 4.2 for visualization of security software. These secure programs can
operate completely independent of the other cells and can control hardware,
through microkernel calls of course. For example, a firewall cell might operate on
the kernel and have complete control of any networked devices. The firewall
would guard all incoming and outgoing communication. Other cells may use the
network by IPC calls to the firewall cell. Any incoming communication would
have to meet strict security protocols implemented in the firewall policy and be
restricted from communication without formal authentication. This firewall cell
could be referred to as a secure network manager.
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Figure 4.2: Isolated cell approach, including security cells.
Authentication and configuration of the device can also be isolated to its
own secure cell. This makes the likelihood of introducing a security flaw into the
software much less than running all of the security programs on the same
system where they must interact with each other. Complexity of the
programming can be exploited to introduce security bugs. This configuration cell
will allow a user to log into the device, perhaps remotely via the firewall/limited
VPN features, and configure the device. No configuration should be possible
except through this cell if it is to be a secure device. Logging programs can also
be implemented in the same way, as parallel cells.
A less secure VPN could be possible into the Linux environment. There
would be no security risk in allowing this unless critical data or processes are
implemented within the Linux environment. Any VPN access to Linux would not
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be able to communicate outside of the cell. This should be done only through a
dedicated networking interface or virtualized networking interface to avoid
contact with other cells or hardware they are using. The VPN features in the
firewall or networking manager could be programmed to allow for a virtualized
device that would be able to reach Linux via IPC. This would be complex, but
more secure than allowing Linux direct access to the network where other device
might be less secure and on a closed network.
This experiment was conducted to test the IPC performance and usability of
these secure cells. As stated above, all cells will communicate by IPC. If this
system of communication is too slow or suffers from excessive use and the
number of possible cells must be limited, the whole security scheme of this
device may be impractical. The architecture example used above hinges on the
ability to isolate every security component in its own virtual space. Without a
secure, readily

available, and efficient method of communication, the

architecture would be useless.

34

CHAPTER V
Performance Evaluation
To test the security of the software, the added layers of security must first
be integrated into either a cell or the Linux image. The cell programs, running
directly on the microkernel, are written in the C programming language and
compiled using the SEL4 library. They are then loaded into memory immediately
after the microkernel. Dite is a memory mapping program used to integrate the
cells into the kernel image. Dite is used to make the kernel executable from a
boot loader such as Grub. Grub was used in all of the testing in this experiment
to load the kernel, which then took possession of the hardware and loaded the
security cells or Linux paravirtualized kernel and image. Four security programs
were tested in the experiment and are described in the following sections.

Cell IPC
IPC was implemented in a separate security cell for performance testing.
Running IPC straight on the kernel has added benefits to performance and
shows how cell to cell communication will be handled and preform in a secure
field device. The IPC program uses two threads within the same cell to
communicate via IPC through the SEL4 microkernel.
The IPC test was modified from the included IPC cell example distributed
with the SEL4 microkernel and was understood using the SEL4 microkernel
manual explaining all of the available kernel calls in the API. Modifications were
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made to include timing for performance testing. The added timing component
was never completed due to the faux calls in the API. The time.h and clock.h
files included with the kernel never contact the hardware clock available to the
system. This created complications. The first attempt was to write code that
would display the time passed between sending and receiving IPC messages in
microseconds. This yielded a return of 0, which was obviously incorrect. The
code was then modified to return the clock cycles past between sending and
receiving. Knowing that the system was running at 100MHZ allowed the user to
calculate the time passed between calls. This as well returned 0. Upon further
investigation it was found that the clock and time functions existed in the API,
but were set to do nothing but return 0. It appears that these functions were
included for completeness so that compiling errors were not caused by lack of
proper available headers, but the code in the headers was never actually
connected to the hardware. This is not documented in the API, but was
discovered when viewing the header files in the API itself. Without a hardware
clock, cell timing performance data could not be gathered.
After completing the cell code, the code is then compiled using the standard
GCC C compiler on Linux configured to cross compile for the target system. Dite
then integrates the compiled program with the microkernel. The image is put
onto a bootable memory stick or hard drive containing the GRUB boot loader.
GRUB is instructed to boot the image on hardware, which consists of placing the
microkernel and cell data into memory and passing off rights to the processor
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and other hardware to the microkernel. The microkernel prepares itself for
operation and starts the secure cell program. The IPC program runs and outputs
the test message transmitted from one thread to another. The first thread writes
a message to the IPC register, which is hardware dependent, and then the
second thread reads the register through kernel calls. The message is displayed
and if transmitted properly should be the same from sending to receiving. This is
done three times and then the program exits.
It was found that the Qemu machine allows for the ttyS0 output data to be
redirected to a telnet server. This was used to analyze the performance of the
IPC calls. Since it was not feasible to time the calls directly in on the microkernel,
timing data was taken in between the written string data that attempted to send
the message and the string data that successfully received the IPC message.
This is less accurate due to the overhead required for writing the messages,
sending the data across the virtualized network interface to the telnet client, and
the extra components of the IPC message program that had to run between
sending and receiving messages, but is favorable to not receiving any
performance data. Table 5.1 shows the results collected from the telnet log.
Putty, an open source telnet client, was modified to write timestamp data to the
log file allowing for timing calculations. Putty was modified for the experiment to
timestamp in seconds, this was not accurate enough and Windows operating
systems do not have a timer that is more accurate than milliseconds. It was
attempted to accurately time to the microsecond level, but the microsecond file
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timer in Windows calculates accurately, but only updates every 10 or more
milliseconds rendering it useless for timing calculations. It was found that a
precompiled fork of Putty named ExtraPutty timestamps correctly on the
millisecond level, therefore this program was used to collect the streaming data
from the microkernel and log it in text file for the experiment. Since millisecond
timing was not preferable, the IPC program was again modified to complete
more than three iterations between the threads and the average time was
calculated for IPC messages.
Table of IPC Message Performance
Iterations

Total Time

Time (ms)

Average Time (ms)

1,000

00:02:165

2165

2.165

10,000

00:20:647

20647

2.065

128,000

04:02:565

242565

1.895

128,000

04:03:692

243698

1.904

500,000

17:29:266

1049266

2.099

1,000,000

34:11:824

2051824

2.052

Table 5.1 – IPC Message Performance
As shown in Table 5.1, the average time to send and receive an IPC
message is between 1.895 ms and 2.165 ms. The performance can be increased
if timing took into account only the sending and receiving of a message.
However, this data, including the overhead for timing and the running IPC
program, shows that the performance on a 100MHz field device is not too
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constrained to obstruct the cells from operating in a useful manner and finding
an alternative means of speedier communication between cells is unnecessary.
The IPC cell operates as expected. The messages transmitted are identical
to the messages received. However, the actual speed performance data was not
gathered in the virtualized machine due to microkernel constraints; we must rely
on the external timing data. This proves that it is possible to write a secure cell
and implement it on the microkernel, that IPC functions do work as expected,
and that other security software should be written from scratch and not rely on
the API if at all possible as there may be other unexpected functions that are
unavailable.

Linux VPN Server
Other security features are implemented inside the Linux image to be run
on a higher level operating system. A VPN program was compiled and installed
within Linux. For the purposes of this experiment it is unnecessary to be able to
access the VPN from the actual network, it was compiled and configured to allow
access only from the loopback networking device. This security addition shows it
is possible to add LEMNOS/OPSAID suggested programs within the embedded
Linux installation making access to the device easier and more secure.
The VPN server program, PeerVPN 0.023, is open source and distributed in
C. It was compiled on the Ubuntu testing machine using the standard GCC
compiler configured to cross compile for the target architecture. A configuration
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file is also necessary for the program to run successfully. This is configured from
the test machine. The program and config file are then entered into the static
Linux image and can be run from the Linux environment.
The Linux image used in this experiment contains a basic root file system
structured as a standard Linux operating system, known as “/”. Programs that
need to accessed by Linux must be located in this file system. It was decided
that any added programs would be put in the folder located at “/bin” which is
already included in the root users “path” so that it can be called from the
command line without added navigation through the file system. Almost all of the
commands available to the root user are located in the “/bin” directory, or
included as a symbolic link if they are elsewhere located. This is standard
practice in Linux environment configuration.
To add an item to the “/bin” directory in the already preconfigured image
requires one of two processes; either the entire image is recreated for the target
architecture using a program called Bitbake for embedded systems and testing,
or the image must be unpacked, modified, and repacked in a format that Linux
will recognize. The first process was initially tested, however several of the
source servers for Bitbake (of which there are 165) were consistently
unavailable. This made compiling Bitbake for testing impossible, causing this
process to be abandoned for the second option of unpacking and manually
modifying the image.
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The image is packed in a CPIO image. Using the CPIO tool in Linux, it is
possible to unpack the image into a directory. The compiled program and
configuration file can then be moved to the “~/image/bin” directory if the image
directory is located in the users home directory. It is necessary to copy the VPN
program with root privileges, as all of the image directory will have root only
access rights and a normal user will be unable to add programs. This can be
done from the command line by tediously typing the directories out or from a
GUI program if the test machine has a program file exploring program with root
access. The Ubuntu test machine does not have such a program, but if the user
is comfortable on the command line it should not be a problem. Almost
everything, including programming, in this experiment was done from the
command line. After the program is successfully copied to the images binary
directory, the image can be repacked. Repacking is slightly more difficult than
unpacking, it must be done with root access rights, find all files recursively in all
subdirectories, and be put into “newc” format. Using the MAN pages of the CPIO
command will instruct the user how to pack into the “newc” format required for a
Linux image. The format for images was not documented anywhere for SEL4,
but was discovered later when images refused to boot. The provided static
image for use with the Wombat Linux kernel was received with no
documentation or explanation for modification.
With a successfully modified file system image, the system can be
instructed to MAKE the wombat supervisor, timing server, and use Dite to
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package them both along with the microkernel and the file system image just
created. The location of the image is specified in the make file for the whole
wombat image. The microkernel image will be made and can be booted similarly
to the IPC image in the previous section, by placing it in memory accessible from
the GRUB boot loader.
Once the microkernel has finished setup and boots the paravirtulized Linux
kernel, the Linux kernel will find the root file system and leave the user at a login
prompt. The only user in the Wombat kernel is “root”. Once logged in, the user
is left at a standard BASH command prompt. The “PeerSVN” program can then
be accessed by calling it directly from the command line. It will start and leave
the server waiting for a connection on the loopback Ethernet device.

Linux VPN Client
Running a VPN server on the field device is useful if it is a primary SCADA
device, however if it is used for collection and sensors it may have to respond to
an outside server for instruction and reporting. In this case, it would be
necessary for the device to contain a VPN client to connect to the main servers
VPN server to create a secure connection.
Similar to the previous section, an open source VPN client package was
cross compiled for the target device and configured. It was then placed in the file
system image exactly as the VPN server was implemented. This yielded
successful results proving that both client and server programs may be ran on
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the device as required. A successful VPN connection was not tested for the
experiment, but the client ran and reported correctly. It is believed that the client
is fully functional, but more testing is required to make certain that it was
implemented correctly and can be used to create a secure connection from the
device to an OPSAID server.

Linux IPC Program
An IPC program was written to be operated from within the Linux
environment, in hopes of testing cell to cell communication between two Linux
Wombat kernels operating in separate cells. The SEL4 API library was completely
modified to allow it to compile a standard Linux application. The modification of
the SEL4 library was successful from a compilation standpoint, however the
microkernel has denied access to many of these functions from higher operating
systems. The software was written similar to the IPC cell program, it would send
an IPC message to the register specified for the target architecture and then try
to read the message.
The program was successfully compiled and placed into the Linux image via
the same process listed in the previous two sections. The system was then
booted and the program was tested. The timing functions, being that the
program is now in an environment with proper time and clock functions using the
Linux timing server, now work as expected. The IPC message is sent, but the
microkernel responds with an message interpreted as an access denied error and
the read function finds a 0 instead of the intended message. It is believed that it
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is impossible to access microkernel functions from within Linux, at least not by
the method described above. Little help could be found on the subject and the
Linux IPC cell to cell experiment was abandoned. The code, along with all other
custom code for the experiment can be found in the appendix.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
This thesis demonstrated the design, implementation, and testing of a
secure field device based on a verified microkernel. The SEL4 microkernel and
software can be implemented on real hardware and further tested using the
previous chapters as a guide for set-up and software configuration. It is hoped
that this research and experimentation has built the foundation for a more
secure device.

Summary
The virtual prototype presented in this thesis has shown that a secure,
memory isolated field device can be implemented. Using open source software,
the device can be affordable and configured for any data collection or control
device. The OPSAID system requirements can be met or exceeded without any
additional hardware. The x86 hardware architecture used in the prototype could
be ported to ARM without much difficulty using similar methods to the building
and compiling of the current x86 system.
The security software implemented in the current design shows that nearly
any necessary software can be implemented as well. If the secure rules outlined
in Chapter II for communication are followed most software could be ported to
the device. It was shown that programs can be compiled for either the higher
Linux operating system or to run directly on the microkernel for an efficient and
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secure program with its own isolated memory space. Programs were created for
and tested in both the Linux environment and directly on the microkernel.
It was observed that if the security program required any outside libraries,
or was not fairly straight forward to implement, that it was much less labor
intensive to create the program for the Linux environment. The microkernel
libraries are limited and incomplete in some places such as access to any sort of
clock or timer. Programs created to run in their own cell directly on the
microkernel should have a specific intended purpose and perform that purpose in
the simplest possible way to avoid creating security bugs. Only security critical
processes, or those that require direct hardware access, should be implemented
in their own cells. A program or process that is convoluted and has additional,
unnecessary features would be best placed in the Linux environment. The Linux
system offers a full-fledged operating system API for a virtualized set of
hardware and interaction with the operating system. This allows for less
challenging programming and cross compilation.
The programs tested performed well for their intended functions. The two
VPN programs compiled for the Linux environment show that a secure device can
be used as both a client and a server device; this shows the flexibility of the
security software. Most standard Linux applications could be compiled for the
device. The VPN software was standard open source software available freely on
the Internet for use in any Linux system, opening the door for any security
application available to be implemented in the device. The microkernel
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application was a modified version of the multi-threaded IPC example included
with the SEL4 microkernel. Until it become a standard architecture, it is unlikely
that an implementation of this device would be able to make use of off-the-shelf
software for single purpose secure cells. These cells would have to be custom
created for the purposes of the device, but it was shown that the software can
function in a private cell. The limitations of these security cells are determined by
the hardware, the microkernel API, and the creativity of the programmer.

Future Research
There is a great need for a secure field device. This experiment and the
prior work is a great start, but there is still much to be done. The road to an
effective security device is not a short one. With small strides, each contributing
researcher is moving the field ahead, with the goal being a completely secured,
inexpensive field device with interchangeable security programs and a
standardized design.
If this experiment were to continue there are a few things that should still
be tested. The most important next step is implementing the device in real
hardware. The virtualized environment worked great for the experiment, but it
would be a leap forward to actually create the device in a useable state. A
generic x86 computer was used for hardware testing, but the output was garbled
for some reason. This was not a problem on the virtual console. For the design
presented in the previous chapters to be useful it would have to be shown to
work on hardware.
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Further research into the current design of this device should also test cell
to cell IPC messages. The prototype described in chapter V showed IPC
communication in a single cell between multiple threads. This is a great start for
microkernel secure communication, but is not of much use without continuing
experimentation. For IPC to be useful, it needs to be used to communicate
between memory isolated processes as it was intended. Preferably, the device
would communicate between two dedicated security cells that had a purpose
other than testing the IPC; for instance, the firewall cell would successfully send
messages to and authentication cell.
It was not determined whether it was possible for the Linux environment to
communicate with outside cells using IPC. If this is possible, two wombat Linux
cells should be created side by side as detailed in chapter V, but have an
additional IPC application to communicate with one another. It would be
beneficial to the device to have multiple Linux environments for the programs
that require Linux libraries to still be isolated, but be able to communicate with
each other and all of the other secure cells directly on the microkernel. Two
wombat images were designed and tested during the experiment, but the IPC
communication could not be shown to function correctly inside the Linux
environment.
The software used in the experiment should be ported to the ARM
architecture. It seems common for SCADA devices to use ARM processors for the
price and power consumption. The SEL4 microkernel is available on both ARM
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and x86. It would be beneficial to test all of the software on both systems to
reach the greatest possible audience for the secure device. This should not be a
difficult task, but was not included in the experiment due to time constraints.
Finally, the device should be thoroughly tested for vulnerabilities. Unless all
of the software on the device is tested, the device cannot truly be considered
secure. It should be reasonable to assume that any intrusion into a single cell
should not compromise the other software, but that is no reason not to test each
component individually.
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Appendices
The appendices section contains the build configurations for the SEL4
microkernel system and any custom code developed and used during the
experiment. Any code not included was not used to collect data, not original to
this thesis, or a derivation of included code too similar to require a separate
attachment.

Build Configurations
Config.mk
# This file contains build configuration variables
# Architecture and platform to build for
export ARCH?=ia32
export PLAT?=pc99
export CFLAGS=-fno-stack-protector
#export ARCH?=arm
#export PLAT?=imx31
# Comment out the line below to build a non-debug kernel and userland
export SEL4_DEBUG_KERNEL=1
# Compile in IOMMU functions
export IOMMU=1
# Tell the build where the toolchain is
ifeq ($(ARCH),arm)
export TOOLPREFIX=arm-oe-linux-gnueabiexport TOOLSUFFIX=
CROSSBINPATH=opt/arm-2010.09/bin
DITEPATH=${PWD}/../tools/dite/build
else
export TOOLPREFIX=i386-unknown-elfexport TOOLSUFFIX=
CROSSBINPATH=/home/kevin/x-tools/i386-unknown-elf/bin
DITEPATH=${PWD}/../tools/dite/build
endif
# Sanity check the toolchain to ensure it really does exist.
ifeq($(strip$(wildcard${CROSSBINPATH}/${TOOLPREFIX}gcc${TOOLSUFFIX})),)
$(error "Could not find your toolchain. Please check your 'config.mk'.")
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endif
# Capability dumps (used by the CapDL Extrator tool) go out on this second
# serial port.
export SEL4_CMDLINE="debug=0x2f8"
# Tell the build where Wombat's prebuilt root filesystem image (in "cpio"
# format) is located. If a root filesystem image is not provided, wombat
# will panic on boot. A full path must be specified.
ROOTFS=${PWD}/misc/image.cpio
# The Linux config file. These are found in source/wombat and are named
# similarly.
LINUX_CONFIG=sel4linux_config_ia32
# The supervisor config file. There are found in:
#
source/wombat-supervisor/include/wombat-supervisor/configs/
SUPERVISOR_CONFIG=system_one_wombat
system_two_wombats.h
#ifndef _SYSTEM_TWO_WOMBATS_H_
#define _SYSTEM_TWO_WOMBATS_H_
void assemble_system(void)
{
enum device_name wombat0_devices[] = {
HARDWARE_NIC_0, HARDWARE_CONSOLE, 0};
enum device_name wombat1_devices[] = {
HARDWARE_NIC_1, HARDWARE_CONSOLE_NO_IRQ, 0};
/* Setup a timer server, and two wombats. */
struct component *timer = register_timer_server_component(
DEFAULT_TIMER_SERVER_PRIO);
struct component *wombat0 = register_wombat_component(
0, "rdinit=/sbin/init wombat0", wombat0_devices, 200,
DEFAULT_WOMBAT_PRIO);
struct component *wombat1 = register_wombat_component(
1, "rdinit=/sbin/init wombat1", wombat1_devices, 200,
249);
/* Connect the timer server to the wombats. */
SYSTEM_CONNECTIONS[0] = (connection_t)
{timer,
wombat0,
VIRTUAL_IRQ,
{.irq=0},
seL4_AllRights};
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seL4_CanWrite,

SYSTEM_CONNECTIONS[1] = (connection_t)
{timer,
wombat1,
VIRTUAL_IRQ,
seL4_AllRights};
};

{.irq=0},

seL4_CanWrite,

#endif /* _SYSTEM_TWO_WOMBATS_H_ */

Custom Code
main.c (for IPC Cell)
#include
#include
#include
#include

<stdio.h>
<sel4/sel4.h>
<sel4/bootinfo.h>
<assert.h>

#include <sel4/sel4.h>
#include <sel4/arch/syscalls.h>
#include <iwana/interrupts.h>
#include <iwana/boot_data.h>
#include <iwana/timer_server.h>
#define STACK_SIZE (1 << seL4_PageBits)
static seL4_CPtr ipc_endpoint = 0;
#define MASK(x) ((1<<(x))-1)
//The new thread will begin executing this function
static void my_other_thread(void) {
printf("\nHello World, this is \"%s\"\n",__FUNCTION__);
//Create a message tag that specifies that the first message
//register should be transferred when an IPC message is sent
seL4_MessageInfo tag = { {.length = 1} };
seL4_Word mr0 = 0;
//Loop forever calling the endpoint
while(1){
printf("%s: Sent message %d of length %d to endpoint %p.\n\n",
__FUNCTION__,
mr0,
tag.length,
(void *)ipc_endpoint);
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//Set the contents of the first message register.
seL4_SetMR(0,mr0);
//Make the call
tag = seL4_Call(ipc_endpoint,tag);
//Get the contents of the first message register. This was
//transferred from the thread that replied to the call.
mr0 = seL4_GetMR(0);
printf("%s: Received message %d of length %d from endpoint %p.\n",
__FUNCTION__,
mr0,
tag.length,
(void*)ipc_endpoint);
}

mr0++;

}
int main(void) {
//Get a pointer to the bootinfo structure from libsel4
seL4_BootInfo* info = seL4_GetBootInfo();
unsigned int i;
printf("\n IPC Test\n\n");
//Find the first free slot in the CSpace
printf("Finding the first free slot in the CSpace...");
seL4_CPtr free_slot = 0;
for (i = 0; i < info->regionCount; i++) {
if(info->regions[i].type == seL4_Region_FreeSlots){
free_slot = info->regions[i].base;
printf("found at %p.\n", (void *)free_slot);
break;
}
}
assert(i != info->regionCount);
//Find the first empty region in the CSpace
printf("Finding the first free empty in the CSpace...");
seL4_CPtr empty_slot = 0;
for (i = 0; i < info->regionCount; i++) {
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if(info->regions[i].type == seL4_Region_Empty){
empty_slot = info->regions[i].base;
printf("found at %p.\n", (void *)empty_slot);
break;
}
}
assert(i != info->regionCount);
seL4_Word vaddr = empty_slot;
//Find the first small block cap
printf("Finding the first Small Block (4K Untyped Capability) ...");
seL4_CPtr four_k_untyped = 0;
for (i = 0; i < info->regionCount; i++) {
if(info->regions[i].type == seL4_Region_SmallBlocks){
four_k_untyped = info->regions[i].base;
printf("found at %p.\n",(void *)four_k_untyped);
break;
}
}
assert(i != info->regionCount);
//Retype the a small block to a TCB
printf("Retyping small block to a TCB...");
seL4_Untyped_Retype_t rresult = seL4_Untyped_Retype(
four_k_untyped,
seL4_TCBObject,
0,
seL4_SelfCSpace,
free_slot >> seL4_PageBits,
seL4_WordBits - seL4_PageBits,
free_slot & MASK(seL4_PageBits),
1);
printf("created %d cap(s) at %p.\n",rresult.result,(void*)free_slot);
seL4_CPtr thread_TCB = free_slot;
assert(!rresult.error);
//Go to the next small block and the next free slot
four_k_untyped++;
free_slot++;
//Retype the small block into an endpoint object
printf("Retyping small block to an endpoint object...");
rresult = seL4_Untyped_Retype(
four_k_untyped,
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seL4_EndpointObject,
0,
seL4_SelfCSpace,
free_slot >> seL4_PageBits,
seL4_WordBits - seL4_PageBits,
free_slot & MASK(seL4_PageBits),
1);
assert(!rresult.error);
printf("created %d cap(s) at %p.\n",rresult.result,(void*)free_slot);
ipc_endpoint = free_slot;
//Go to the next small block and the next free slot
four_k_untyped++;
free_slot++;
//Retype the small block into a 4K frame for the IPC buffer
printf("Retyping small block to an 4K frame...");
rresult = seL4_Untyped_Retype(
four_k_untyped,
#ifdef IA32
seL4_IA32_4K,
#else
seL4_ARM_SmallPageObject,
#endif
0,
seL4_SelfCSpace,
free_slot >> seL4_PageBits,
seL4_WordBits - seL4_PageBits,
free_slot & MASK(seL4_PageBits),
1);
assert(!rresult.error);
printf("created %d cap(s) at %p.\n",rresult.result,(void*)free_slot);
seL4_Word four_k = free_slot;
printf("Mapping 4K frame (%p) to free vadd (%p).\n", (void *)four_k,
(void*)empty_slot);
#ifdef IA32
int result = seL4_IA32_Page_Map(
#else
int result = seL4_ARM_Page_Map(
#endif
four_k,
seL4_SelfVSpace,
empty_slot,
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seL4_AllRights,
#ifdef IA32
seL4_IA32_Default_VMAttributes);
#else
seL4_ARM_Default_VMAttributes);
#endif
assert(!result);
//Set up new thread's IPC buffer
printf("Setting up IPC buffer on new thread...");
result = seL4_TCB_SetIPCBuffer(
thread_TCB,
vaddr,
four_k);
assert(!result);
//Set up the VSpace and CSpace on the new thread
printf("Setting TCB CSpace and VSpace..");
result = seL4_TCB_SetSpace(
thread_TCB,
0,
seL4_SelfCSpace,
seL4_NilData,
seL4_SelfVSpace,
seL4_NilData);
assert(!result);
//Write the registers of the new thread.
//This sets a new thread running at the
//default priority
printf("Starting up new thread...");
static char stack[STACK_SIZE];
#ifdef IA32
seL4_UserContext frame = {.regs = {.eip = (unsigned int)my_other_thread,
.esp = (unsigned int)&stack[STACK_SIZE] }};
#else
seL4_UserContext frame = {.regs = {.pc = (unsigned int)my_other_thread, .sp
= (unsigned int)&stack[STACK_SIZE] }};
#endif
result = seL4_TCB_WriteRegisters(
thread_TCB,
true,
0,
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sizeof(seL4_UserContext) / sizeof(seL4_Word),
&frame);
assert(!result);
//Wait for someone to send us an IPC
seL4_Word sender_badge = 0;
printf("%s: Waiting on IPC...\n",__FUNCTION__);
seL4_MessageInfo tag = seL4_Wait( ipc_endpoint, &sender_badge);
seL4_Word mr0 = seL4_GetMR(0);
printf("%s: Recv'd message %d of length %d from endpoint %p.\n",
__FUNCTION__,
mr0,
tag.length,
(void *)ipc_endpoint);
//Repeat the cycle three times
for(i = 0; i < 250000; i++){
//Reply to the IPC and wait for another
seL4_SetMR(0,++mr0);
printf("%s: Sent message %d of length %d to endpoint %p.\n\n",
__FUNCTION__,
mr0,
tag.length,
(void *)ipc_endpoint);
tag = seL4_ReplyWait(ipc_endpoint,tag, &sender_badge);
mr0 = seL4_GetMR(0);

}

printf("%s: Recv'd message %d of length %d from endpoint %p.\n",
__FUNCTION__,
mr0,
tag.length,
(void *)ipc_endpoint);

printf("\nDone.\n\n");
return 0;
}
ipc.c (IPC inside Linux)
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
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#include "sel4/sel4.h"
#include "sel4/bootinfo.h"
#include <assert.h>
int main(void)
{
time_t now;
time(&now);
printf("%s", ctime(&now));
printf("\nHello World, this is \"%s\"\n","testipc");
//Create a message tag that specifies that the first message
//register should be transferred when an IPC message is sent
seL4_MessageInfo tag = { {.length = 1} };
seL4_Word mr0 = 129;
printf("%s: Sent message %d of length %d to endpoint %p.\n\n",
"test2",
mr0,
tag.length,
(void *)0x0000006d);
//Set the contents of the first message register.
seL4_SetMR(0,mr0);
//Make the call
tag = seL4_Call(0,tag);
//Get the contents of the first message register. This was
//transferred from the thread that replied to the call.
mr0 = seL4_GetMR(0);
printf("%s: Received message %d of length %d from endpoint %p.\n",
"test3",
mr0,
tag.length,
(void*)0x0000006d);
}

return 0;
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